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COMMENT

How CALIFORNIA GOT IT RIGHT:
MINING INRE MARRIAGE CASES FOR THE SEEDS OF A
VIABLE FEDERAL CHALLENGE TO
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE BANS

I.

INTRODUCTION

California is at the forefront of a battle over equality. As
individuals, couples, and groups challenge statutory and even
constitutional bans on same-sex marriage with varying degrees of
success across the country, a constitutional ban that has, thus far,
withstood state constitutional challenge invalidated and replaced
California's statutory ban. However, the plaintiffs in Perry v.
Schwarzenegger' have federalized the issue, asking a United States
district court to invalidate California's ban under the Fourteenth
Amendment's guarantees of substantive due process and equal
protection of the laws. 2 In 2008, the landmark decision In re Marriage
Cases3 made California the second United States jurisdiction to
judicially recognize the right of same-sex couples to marry.4 The
petitioners' winning argument in that case relied primarily on the state
equal protection and due process clauses to overturn California's
statutory ban on same sex marriage.5 However, the petitioners'
1. 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
2. Id. at 927.
3. 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008).
4. See id. at 400. In 2003, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
interpreted its state constitution to prohibit the state from denying a marriage license
to same-sex couples. Goodridge v. Dept. of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948
(Mass. 2003).
5. See Opening Brief on the Merits at 11-35, In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d
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reasoning may be applicable to the federal equal protection and due
process doctrine as well.
Some have called the legitimacy of laws restricting civil marriage
to opposite-sex couples "the civil rights issue of our time," 6 and courts
around the country have begun to strike down laws that deny
individuals the right to marry based on sexual orientation.7 Although
courts have generally framed the issue as a question of state
constitutional law, Perry is the first case to posit the issue directly as a
federal question. As this is a question of great national debate and
importance, it is likely that the parties will seek U.S. Supreme Court
review regardless of the decisions in the district court and the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals. Indeed, this appears to be the end to which
the attorneys on the case aspire.8 Owing to Proposition 8's typical
language, 9 there can be little doubt that a U.S. Supreme Court decision
384 (Cal. 2008) (No. S 147999).
6. Kristin D. Shotwell, Note, The State Marriage Cases: Implications for
Hawaii's MarriageEquality Debate in the Post-Lawrence and Romer Era, 31 U.
HAW. L. REV. 653, 653 (2009).
7. See, e.g., Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 412 (Conn.
2008); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 872 (Iowa 2009); Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d
at 969-70.
8. Margaret Talbot, A Risky Proposal:Is it Too Soon to Petition the Supreme
Court on Gay Marriage?, NEW YORKER, January 18, 2010, available at
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/01/18/100118fa fact talbot?currentPage
=all.
9. In response to the California Supreme Court's decision in In re Marriage
Cases, 52.3% of California voters enacted an initiative constitutional amendment,
known as Proposition 8. DEBRA BOWEN, CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE,
STATEMENT OF VOTE: NOVEMBER 4, 2008 GENERAL ELECTION 7 (2008), available

at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2008_general/sov complete.pdf. Proposition
8 added the following language to the California Constitution: "Only marriage
between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California." CAL. CONST. art.
I, § 7.5.
The language of California's Proposition 8 is representative of the language
other states have used to write same-sex marriage bans into their own state
constitutions. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25 ("To be valid or recognized in
this State, a marriage may exist only between one man and one woman."); MO.
CONST. art. I, § 33 ("That to be valid and recognized in this state, a marriage shall
exist only between a man and a woman."); OR. CONsT. art. XV, § 5a ("It is the
policy of Oregon, and its political subdivisions, that only a marriage between one
man and one woman shall be valid or legally recognized as a marriage.").
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in Perry would echo far outside California's borders. Such a decision
would determine the constitutional validity of all state and federal
laws restricting the institution of civil marriage to opposite-sex
couples.
This Comment details that the petitioners' argument in In re
MarriageCases can be adapted to work a viable federal challenge to
Proposition 8 and similar statutory and constitutional provisions
across the nation. Indeed, a compelling case can be made that samesex marriage bans both (1) abridge same-sex couples' fundamental
right to marry without a compelling government justification, thereby
depriving them of substantive due process; and (2) impermissibly
discriminate on the basis of sex, denying same-sex couples equal
protection of the laws. While preparing this Comment for publication,
the district court in Perry agreed, finding Proposition 8
unconstitutional on both due process'o and equal protection" bases.
This Comment will proceed as follows: Section II will examine
the historical background of California's struggle for marriage
equality, concentrating especially on the events immediately
preceding and giving rise to Perry. Section III explores important
differences between California's equal protection doctrine and its
federal counterpart. Section III argues that classifications based on
sexual orientation are reducible to classifications based on sex, and
therefore should at least enjoy intermediate scrutiny. Section IV
discusses federal due process jurisprudence as it relates to marriage
10. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 995 (N.D. Cal. 2010)
("Accordingly, Proposition 8 violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."); id. at 994-95 ("Because plaintiffs seek to exercise their fundamental
right to marry, their claim is subject to strict scrutiny. . . . As explained in detail in
the equal protection analysis, Proposition 8 cannot withstand rational basis review.
Still less can Proposition 8 survive the strict scrutiny required by plaintiffs' due
process claim.").
11. Id. at 997 ("[T]he Equal Protection Clause renders Proposition 8
unconstitutional under any standard of Review."); id. at 996-97 ("Having considered
the evidence, the relationship between sex and sexual orientation and the fact that
Proposition 8 eliminates a right only a gay man or a lesbian would exercise, the
court determines that plaintiffs' equal protection claim is based on sexual
orientation, but this claim is equivalent to a claim of discrimination based on sex...
. Although Proposition 8 fails to possess even a rational basis, the evidence
presented at trial shows that gays and lesbians are the type of minority strict scrutiny
was designed to protect.").
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equality, and identifies how Proposition 8 likely violates federal
substantive due process guarantees.

II. BACKGROUND

In 1971, the California legislature amended its marriage statute to
use gender-neutral terms.1 2 This change, coupled with the repeal of
California's criminal consensual sodomy statute in 1976, led some
people to conclude that California had recognized same-sex
marriage. 13 The legislature quickly re-amended the civil marriage
statute to clarify that same-sex marriage remained unlawful in
California.14 California's modern civil marriage statute is Family
Code section 300.'" Section 300, as it existed before the In re
MarriageCases decision, 1 6 provided, in relevant part, that "[m]arriage
is a personal relation arising out of a civil contract between a man and
a woman, to which the consent of the parties capable of making that
contract is necessary." 7
California Family Code section 308 generally binds the State to
recognize marriages validly contracted in another state.' 8 Because the
language of section 308 was unqualified, some California voters
12.

In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 408 (Cal. 2008) ("In 1971 .

.

. the

provisions of Civil Code section 4101, subdivision (a), which previously had set the
age of consent for marriage for men at 21 years of age and for women at 18 years of
age, were modified to provide a uniform age of consent of 18 years of age for both
genders. In revising the language of section 4101 to equalize the minimum age for
men and women, the 1971 legislation eliminated references to 'male' and 'female,'
so that section 4101, subdivision (a), as amended in 1971, stated simply that '[a]ny
unmarried person of the age of 18 years or upwards, and not otherwise disqualified,
is capable of consenting to and consummating marriage."'(citation omitted)).
13. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM
SEXUAL LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT 56 (1996).
14. Id.

15. CAL. FAM. CODE § 300 (West 2004 & Supp. 2010).
16. In re Marriage Cases held unconstitutional the words in section 300
"between a man and a woman." See infra notes 22-41 and accompanying text.
17. CAL. FAM. CODE § 300 (West 2004).
18. CAL. FAM. CODE § 308 (West 2004) ("A marriage contracted outside this
state that would be valid by the laws of the jurisdiction in which the marriage was
contracted is valid in this state.").
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speculated that California would recognize same-sex marriages
performed in other states. 19 When the Hawaii Supreme Court
overturned Hawaii's same-sex marriage ban in 1993,20 many states
began enacting laws that denied recognition to same-sex marriages
performed in other states. 2 1 On March 7, 2000, California voters
enacted Proposition 22, which added California Family Code section
308.5.22 Section 308.5 provided that "[o]nly marriage between a man
and a woman is valid or recognized in California." 23
On February 10, 2004, San Francisco Mayor Gavin Newsom
directed the County Clerk to begin issuing marriage forms and
licenses to individuals without regard to their gender or sexual
orientation. 24 Same-sex couples began applying for, and receiving,
marriage licenses on February 12, 2004.25 Opponents of same-sex
marriage filed two separate lawsuits to enjoin the issuance of marriage
licenses to same-sex couples. 26 Proponents of same-sex marriage filed

19.

See DANA S. KRUNKENBERG ET AL., REBUTTAL TO ARGUMENT AGAINST

PROPOSITION 22 (2000), available at http://primary2000.sos.ca.gov/VoterGuide/
Propositions/22norbt.htm.
20. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
21. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 412 n.20 (Cal. 2008).
22. Id. at 409.
23.

CAL. FAM. CODE

§ 308.5 (West 2004).

24. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 402. Mayor Newsom noted that
"California courts have ... stated that discrimination against gay men and lesbians
is invidious . . . [and] have held that gender discrimination is suspect and invidious

as well." Letter from Gavin Newsom, Mayor of S.F., to Nancy Alfaro, Cnty. Clerk
of
S.F.
(Feb.
10,
2004),
http://news.findlaw.comi/cnn/docs/glrts/
sfmayor21OO4ltr.html. Relying on both these California cases and other state
supreme court cases that "held that equal protection provisions in their state
constitutions prohibit discrimination against gay men and lesbians with respect to
the rights and obligations flowing from marriage," and following his "sworn duty to
uphold the California Constitution," Mayor Newsom determined that marriage
licenses should issue "on a non-discriminatory basis, without regard to gender or
sexual orientation." Id.
25. In re MarriageCases, 183 P.3d at 402-03 (mentioning that approximately
4,000 marriages were performed before the California Supreme Court enjoined the
practice).
26. Proposition 22 Legal Def. and Educ. Fund v. City & Cnty. of S.F., No.
CPF-04-503943 (Cal. Super. Ct. S.F. City & Cnty., Aug. 12, 2004) and Thomasson
v. Newsom, No. CGC-04-428794 (Cal. Super. Ct. S.F. City & Cnty., Aug. 12, 2004)
(subsequently renamed Campaignfor CaliforniaFamilies v. Newsom).
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four other suits that challenged the validity of Family Code sections
300 and 308.5.27 In re Marriage Cases was a single, consolidated
proceeding comprised of these six cases. 28 On August 12, 2004, the
California Supreme Court entered a writ of mandate finding that
Mayor Newsom had exceeded his authority under then-existing
sections 300 and 308.5.29 The writ also ordered San Francisco officials
to enforce sections 300 and 308.5 "unless and until they are judicially
determined to be unconstitutional."3 0 As a result, the writ nullified
marriage certificates issued to same-sex couples before its entry. 31 The
court emphasized, however, that the question of whether sections 300
and 308.5 were constitutionally valid was not before it and expressed
no opinion to that question while the matter was pending in the trial
court.32
On April 13, 2005, the trial court in In re Marriage Cases held
sections 300 and 308.5 unconstitutional, finding the statutes
discriminated on the basis of sex, and thereby violated the state equal
protection clause. 33 The California Court of Appeal, First District,
Division Three reversed, finding no sex discrimination. 34 The court of
appeal also rejected arguments that the statutes impermissibly
infringed upon the fundamental right to marry and the right to privacy
as recognized in the California Constitution. 35 The California Supreme
Court reversed the decision of the court of appeal, holding each
section of the Family Code unconstitutional under both the state due
process and equal protection clauses. 36 The court recognized sexual
orientation as a suspect classification for equal protection purposes,
rejecting the petitioners' argument that the marriage statutes
discriminated on the basis of sex. 37 The court also found the marriage
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 402-04.
See id. at 401 n.6.
Lockyer v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 95 P.3d 459, 464 (Cal. 2004).
Id.
Id.
Id.
In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 404 (Cal. 2008).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 400, 402.
Id. at 401.
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statutes impermissibly restricted the fundamental right to marry under
the California Constitution, and enjoined state officials from denying
marriage licenses to same-sex couples. 38
"The backlash against this decision was swift and furious." 39
Voters responded to In re MarriageCases by enacting Proposition 8,
an initiative constitutional amendment modeled after Family Code
section 308.5.40 Using language identical to section 308.5, Proposition
8 restored California's same-sex marriage ban.4 1 One day after voters
enacted Proposition 8, its opponents filed three lawsuits 42 -later
consolidated in the California Supreme Court as Strauss v. Horton.4 3
The opponents sought to invalidate Proposition 8 as an impermissible
revision of the California Constitution. 44 However, the California
Supreme Court upheld Proposition 8 as a permissible amendment to
the state's constitution.4 Although it is an interesting study in the
38. Id. at 400, 453.
39. Shotwell, supra note 6, at 671.
40. California's voter initiative process empowers California voters "to
propose statutes and amendments to the Constitution and to adopt or reject them."
CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(a). Further, section 8(b) provides:
An initiative measure may be proposed by presenting to the Secretary of
State a petition that sets forth the text of the proposed statute or
amendment to the Constitution and is certified to have been signed by
electors equal in number to 5 percent in the case of a[n initiative] statute,
and 8 percent in the case of an [initiative] amendment to the Constitution,
of the votes for all candidates for Governor at the last gubernatorial
election.
CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(b).
41. "Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in
California." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5. Cf CAL. FAM. CODE § 308.5 (West 2004)
("Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California.").
42. Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 68-69 (Cal. 2009).
43. Id. at 69.
44. Id. at 60. California's constitution may be modified in two ways: (1)
constitutional amendments "propose changes specific and limited in nature"; (2)
constitutional revisions, by contrast, make "far reaching change[s] in the
fundamental governmental structure or the foundational power of its branches." Id.
at 88, 101. California voters may amend the state constitution by initiative. CAL.
CONsT. art. XVIII, § 3. However, revisions must be proposed by constitutional
convention or two-thirds of the state legislature, and ratified by the voters. CAL.
CONST. art. XVIII, §§ 1-2.
45. Strauss, 207 P.3d at 110.
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exercise of direct democracy, Strauss will have little or no force
outside of California due to the unique nature of California's
amendment-revision process.4 6 Thus, whatever the Strauss court may
have decided with respect to California's initiative process, it is not
relevant to the question addressed by this Comment.
On May 22, 2009, two same-sex couples filed Perry v.
Schwarzenegger in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California.4 7 On August 4, 2010, the district court ruled Proposition 8
was unconstitutional under both the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. 4 8 In contrast to Strauss, which
dealt with the power of California voters vis-A-vis the California
Constitution, 49 Perry directly challenges Proposition 8 on federal due
process and equal protection grounds.50 This Comment now turns to
the viability of this federal challenge.
III. EQUAL PROTECTION

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that no state may "deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws."51 Courts have read a similar
provision, applicable to the federal government, into the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. 52 Equal protection of the laws has
proven to be a much more elusive concept than these thirteen simple
words would suggest. In fact,

46. M.K.B. Darmer & Tiffany Chang, Moving Beyond the "Immutability
Debate" in the Fightfor Equality after Proposition8, 12 SCHOLAR 1, 6-7 (2009).
47. Complaint, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. May
22, 2009) (No. CV-09-2292).
48. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
49. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
50. Complaint, supra note 47, at 8-9.
51. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
52. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533 (1973)
(recognizing "the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment"); Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964) ("[W]hile the Fifth
Amendment contains no equal protection clause, it does forbid discrimination that is
'so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process."'(citation omitted)).
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[w]hile the language of the ... Equal Protection Clause[] is plain,
the long history of civil rights movements in this country has
shown group after group battle for the recognition of their rights
and equality. On many occasions, it has been necessary for the
Supreme Court to articulate elevated federal protections for a
group that would otherwise face discrimination and inequity when
subject to the whims of the majority."
Modem equal protection analysis involves two such "elevated"
federal protections, and one baseline standard. The most elevated and
searching of these protections is strict scrutiny, which courts apply to
laws that discriminate based on a suspect classification, such as race,
national origin, or alienage. 54 The other elevated protection is
intermediate scrutiny, which courts apply to laws drawing "quasisuspect" classifications, such as gender classifications. 5 ' Finally, most
laws do not draw invidious classifications and courts review such laws
only to ensure that a rational connection exists between the ends and
the means employed to achieve them. 56 These standards of review are
discussed in Section 111(A) of this Comment.
The Supreme Court's equal protection doctrine with respect to
sexual orientation is quite underdeveloped. The standard of review
applied to a challenged classification is frequently outcomedeterminative. Thus, whether courts should deem sexual orientation
a suspect or quasi-suspect classification for equal protection purposes
53. Darmer & Chang, supra note 46, at 11 (citations omitted).
54. See infra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
55. See infra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
56. See infra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
57. The Court has decided at least one sexual orientation case on equal
protection grounds, but in doing so purported to use rational basis review. See infra
notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
58. See generally United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996). There, the
Virginia Military Institute sought to justify a gender classification on the ground that
it furthered its interest in ensuring "diversity in educational approaches." Id. at 535.
The Supreme Court rejected that justification, holding that "Virginia has shown no
'exceedingly persuasive justification' for excluding all women from the citizensoldier training afforded by VMI." Id. at 534. By contrast, under rational basis
review, this classification probably would have survived; ensuring diversity in
educational approaches is almost certainly a legitimate state interest even if it is not
important enough to survive intermediate scrutiny, and a rational legislature could
have found that having a single-sex school addresses some part of that interest.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2010

9

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 41, No. 1 [2010], Art. 5

58

CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 41

is highly relevant to the constitutionality of measures like Proposition
8. To that end, this Comment will survey the differences between
California and federal equal protection law to identify the critical
ways in which these two doctrines are the same. This comparison will
provide a foundation by which the Petitioners' argument in In re
Marriage Cases can be successfully adapted to federal equal
protection precedent. This section ultimately concludes that
classifications based on sexual orientation are reducible to
classifications based on gender. Therefore, laws that draw lines based
on sexual orientation are quasi-suspect and should be subject to
intermediate scrutiny on federal review.
A. EqualProtection in the UnitedStates Supreme Court
Federal equal protection jurisprudence recognizes three standards
of review: strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and rational-basis
review. These standards were introduced above and will be further
developed here.
1. Strict Scrutinyfor Suspect Classifications
A suspect class is one "'saddled with such disabilities, or
subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or
relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command
extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.""' To
date, courts have recognized only three suspect classifications: race, 60
59. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 506 n.13 (1976) (quoting San Antonio
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)). See also Plyler v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202, 218 n.14 (1982) ("Several formulations might explain our treatment of
certain classifications as 'suspect.' Some classifications are more likely than others
to reflect deep-seated prejudice rather than legislative rationality in pursuit of some
legitimate objective. Legislation predicated on such prejudice is easily recognized as
incompatible with the constitutional understanding that each person is to be judged
individually and is entitled to equal justice under the law. Classifications treated as
suspect tend to be irrelevant to any proper legislative goal. Finally, certain groups,
indeed largely the same groups, have historically been 'relegated to such a position
of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process."' (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)) (internal citations omitted)).
60. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) ("At the very least, the
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national origin, 6 1 and alienage. 62 Although immutability of the
characteristic by which the class is defined and minority status are
also frequently cited as "requirements" for recognition as a suspect
classification, it appears that these are subsidiary considerations at
best. 63
Courts strictly scrutinize laws that disadvantage a suspect class to
ensure the "classification has been precisely tailored to serve a
compelling governmental interest." 64 Even where a compelling state
interest exists, the classification must be necessary to achieve that
compelling interest.6 5 If a less discriminatory alternative classification
exists, the classification is neither necessary nor narrowly drawn and
must fail strict scrutiny. 6 6
Equal Protection Clause demands that racial classifications, especially suspect in
criminal statutes, be subjected to the 'most rigid scrutiny."' (quoting Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944))); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184,
191-92 (1964) ("[W]e deal here with a classification based upon the race of the
participants, which must be viewed in light of the historical fact that the central
purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate racial discrimination
emanating from official sources in the States. This strong policy renders racial
classifications 'constitutionally suspect,' and subject to the 'most rigid scrutiny."'
(internal citations omitted)).
61. See, e.g., Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 640 (1948) ("In our view of
the case, the State has discriminated against Fred Oyama; the discrimination is based
solely on his parents' country of origin; and there is absent the compelling
justification which would be needed to sustain discrimination of that nature."); id. at
646 ("'Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their
very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine
of equality."' (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943))).
62. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971) ("[T]he
Court's decisions have established that classifications based on alienage, like those
based on nationality or race, are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial
scrutiny." (citations omitted)).
63. "[T]he United States Supreme Court has granted suspect class status to a
group whose distinguishing characteristic is not immutable." Kerrigan v. Comm'r of
Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 427 (Conn. 2008).
64. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 217.
65. Ly Tran, Sick and Tired of the Knox-Keene Act: The Equal Protection
Right of Non-Mexican Californians to Enroll in Mexico-Based HMO Plans, 14 Sw.
J.L. & TRADE AM. 357, 369 (2008) ("State-imposed classifications based on national
origin, like racial classifications, will only be allowed if the state can show that the
discrimination is necessary to achieve a compelling government purpose.").
66. See generally Kacy Elizabeth Wiggum, Defining Family in American
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Courts apparently determine whether the interest asserted in
defense of a challenged classification is "compelling" on a case-bycase basis. However, the Supreme Court has found some interests
compelling, including: the prevention of sabotage and espionage in a
time of war, 67 diversity in law school admissions, 68 and remedying the
effects of the government's own past discrimination. 69
2. IntermediateScrutinyfor Quasi-Suspect Classifications
"Legislative classifications based on gender also call for a
heightened standard of review." 70 However, the United States
Supreme Court has also recognized that some gender classifications
"realistically reflect[] the fact that the sexes are not similarly situated
in certain circumstances."71 Thus, the Supreme Court deems gender
classifications "quasi-suspect" and applies an intermediate level of
scrutiny to laws drawing gender classifications.72
A gender classification will fail unless it is "'substantially related
to a legitimate state interest."' 73 While the interest required need not
be compelling, the Supreme Court's equal protection jurisprudence
"reveal[s] a strong presumption that gender classifications are

Prisons,30 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 357, 404 (2009).
67. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216, 218 (1944).
68. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003).
69. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 492 (1989).
70. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
71. Michael M. v. Super. Ct. of Sonoma Cnty., 450 U.S. 464, 469 (1981)
(citations omitted). With respect to suspect classifications, by contrast, the Court
has noted that "[t]hese factors are so seldom relevant to the achievement of any
legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such considerations are deemed to
reflect prejudice and antipathy-a view that those in the burdened class are not as
worthy or deserving as others. For these reasons and because such discrimination is
unlikely to be soon rectified by legislative means, these laws are subjected to strict
scrutiny and will be sustained only if they are suitably tailored to serve a compelling
state interest." CleburneLiving Ctr., 473 U.S. at 440.
72. Illegitimacy is also treated as a quasi-suspect classification in certain
circumstances. See, e.g., Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 441. However, this
Comment's discussion of intermediate scrutiny focuses on gender as a quasi-suspect
class.
73. Id. (quoting Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 99 (1982)).
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invalid." 74 Indeed, the
"toothless."75

intermediate

scrutiny

standard

is not

[T]he reviewing court must determine whether the proffered
justification is "exceedingly persuasive." The burden of
justification is demanding and it rests entirely on the State. . . . The
justification must be genuine, not hypothesized or invented post
hoc in response to litigation. And it must not rely on overbroad
generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or
preferences of males and females.76
Examples of interests courts have found sufficiently important to
support a gender classification include facilitating a relationship
between parent and child7 7 and remedying the effects of past
economic discrimination on women.7 8 Even where an important
government interest underlies the challenged classification, the
classification must bear a "fair and substantial relation[ship]" to the
achievement of that interest. 79
3. Rational Basis Review

Courts review laws that do not draw suspect or quasi-suspect
classifications only to ensure a rational connection exists between the
classification and a conceivable legitimate state interest.s0 "The
Fourteenth Amendment's promise that no person shall be denied the
equal protection of the law must coexist with the practical necessity
that most legislation classifies for one purpose or another, with
resulting disadvantage to various groups or persons." 8 ' The Supreme

74. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532 (1996) (quoting with approval
J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 152 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
75. Matthews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976).
76. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533 (citations omitted).
77. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 63 (2001).
78. See, e.g., Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977).
79. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
80. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
81. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (citing Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v.
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 271-272 (1979), and F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Va., 253 U.S.
412,415 (1920)).
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Court has "attempted to reconcile [this] principle with ... reality"
through the rational basis test. 82 Under rational basis review, a
challenged classification "is presumed to be valid and will be
sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related
to a legitimate state interest." 83 Such a classification will be upheld
"even if [it] seems unwise or works to the disadvantage of a particular
group, or if the rationale for it seems tenuous,"8 4 because "the
Constitution presumes that even improvident decisions will eventually
be rectified by the democratic process[]."" "Although parties
challenging legislation under the Equal Protection Clause may
introduce evidence supporting their claim that [the classification] is
irrational, they cannot prevail so long as 'it is evident from all the
considerations presented .. . and those of which [judicial notice is
taken], that the question is at least debatable."' 86
Because rational basis review is highly deferential to legislative
action, it is normally very difficult to invalidate an enactment under
this standard.8 7 However, the deference shown to legislatures is not
without exceptions, even under rational basis review. For example,
where the challenged classification imposes a disadvantage "born of
animosity toward the class of persons affected,"8 8 the Supreme Court
has examined the classification more closely than it would under
rational basis review. In the landmark case Romer v. Evans, the Court
struck down a Colorado constitutional amendment, designated
"Amendment 2."89 The amendment singled out persons according to
"homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation" and denied them
"minority status, quota preferences, protected status or claim of
discrimination." 90 The Court explained:

82. Romer, 517 U.S. at 631.
83. CleburneLiving Ctr., 473 U.S. at 440.
84. Romer, 517 U.S. at 632.
85. CleburneLiving Ctr., 473 U.S. at 440.
86. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 464 (1981)
(citations omitted).
87. See, e.g., Darmer & Chang,supra note 46, at 12 ("[R]ational basis analysis
... gives great deference to the state's actions . . .

88. Romer, 517 U.S. at 634.
89. Id.
90. COLO. CONST. art. 2, § 30b (1993).
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"If the constitutional conception of 'equal protection of the laws'
means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare . . .
desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a
legitimate governmental interest."
.. . [The challenged provision] is a status-based enactment

divorced from any factual context from which we could discern a
relationship to legitimate state interests; it is a classification of
persons undertaken for its own sake, something the Equal
Protection Clause does not permit. 9'
It is important to note that Romer invalidated Colorado's
Amendment 2 despite the State advancing at least one conceivable
legitimate state interest in support of its challenged provision. 92 Romer
would seem to indicate, at a minimum, that classifications resulting
from animus toward the disadvantaged class cannot be legitimately or
rationally grounded and must fail even rational basis review. The
majority opinion in Lawrence v. Texas 93 seems to support this
inference.94
B. EqualProtection in California
California's equal protection jurisprudence has evolved somewhat
differently than its federal counterpart. The California Supreme Court
91. Romer, 517 U.S. at 634-35 (citations omitted).
92. See id. at 635 ("Colorado ... cites its interest in conserving resources to
fight discrimination against other groups."); id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(proposing a second legitimate state interest, that the challenged provision is "a
modest attempt by seemingly tolerant Coloradans to preserve traditional sexual
mores against the efforts of a politically powerful minority to revise those mores
through use of the laws").
93. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
94. See id. at 577-78 ("'[T]he fact that the governing majority in a State has
traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for
upholding a law prohibiting the practice; neither history nor tradition could save a
law prohibiting miscegenation from constitutional attack.' . . . The petitioners are

entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot demean their existence or
control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime."). See also id.
at 580 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("We have consistently held, however, that some
objectives, such as 'a bare . .. desire to harm a politically unpopular group,' are not
legitimate state interests." (quoting U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528,
534 (1973))). For a discussion of Lawrence, which was decided on substantive due
process grounds, see infra Section IV.A.2.
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recognizes only two tiers of scrutiny for purposes of equal
protection. 95 "Although in most instances the deferential 'rational
basis' standard of review is applicable in determining whether
different treatment accorded by a statutory provision violates the state
equal protection clause, . . . 'strict scrutiny' . . . is applied when the

distinction drawn by a statute rests upon a.. . 'suspect
classification."' 96 The strict scrutiny standard utilized by the
California Supreme Court is identical to the federal test. 97
Under California precedent, laws that classify similarly situated
people on the basis of sex or gender are treated as suspect. California
appears to recognize limited, if any, situations where valid gender
distinctions can be drawn on the basis of "basic biological
differences." 99 Addressing gender

classifications,

the

California

Supreme Court explained:
Sex, like race and lineage, is an immutable trait, a status into
which the class members are locked by the accident of birth. What
differentiates sex from nonsuspect statuses, such as intelligence or
physical disability, and aligns it with the recognized suspect
classifications is that the characteristic frequently bears no relation

to ability to perform or contribute to society. The result is that the
whole class is relegated to an inferior legal status without regard to
the capabilities or characteristics of its individual members. Where
the relation between characteristic and evil to be prevented is so
tenuous, courts must look closely at classifications based on that
characteristic lest outdated social stereotypes result in invidious
laws or practices. 0

95. Shotwell, supra note 6, at 672.
96. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 401 (Cal. 2008).
97. Id. ("Under the strict scrutiny standard ...

in order to demonstrate the

constitutional validity of a challenged statutory classification the state must establish
(1) that the state interest intended to be served by the differential treatment not only
is a constitutionally legitimate interest, but is a compelling state interest, and (2) that
the differential treatment not only is reasonably related to but is necessary to serve
that compelling state interest.").
98. Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 485 P.2d 529, 541 (Cal. 1971) ("We conclude
that the sexual classifications are properly treated as suspect.").
99. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 73 (2001).
100. Sail'erInn, 485 P.2d at 540 (citations omitted).
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Thus, California courts treat classifications deemed quasi-suspect
by the U.S. Supreme Court as suspect. As a result, intermediate
scrutiny and quasi-suspect classifications do not exist under California
law.' 0 1
A law that neither draws a suspect classification nor abridges a
fundamental right is subject only to rational basis review. 10 2 Like its
federal counterpart, the California rational basis standard "requires
merely that distinctions drawn by a challenged statute bear some
rational relationship to a conceivable legitimate state purpose."1 03
Although the California rationality test does not appear to have any
differences in formulation or general application from the federal
standard, courts have not recently applied the California test in cases
involving sexual orientation. Rather, California law has long
forbidden discrimination based on sexual orientation, 104 and
discrimination cases involving sexual orientation tended to be
resolved as statutory, rather than constitutional, questions. 105 By
contrast, the federal cases have purported to treat sexual orientation
classifications under the rational basis standard, even though recent
federal cases have invalidated such classifications using language that
suggests an unidentified, heightened standard of review may be at
work. 0 6
101. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 436 n.55 ("Past California
decisions . . . have applied

the strict scrutiny standard

when

evaluating

discriminatory classifications based on sex, and have not applied an intermediate
scrutiny standard under equal protection principles in any case involving a suspect
(or quasi-suspect) classification." (citations omitted)).
102. See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 401; Hernandez v. City of
Hanford, 159 P.3d 33, 46 (2007).
103. Id. at 435 (citations omitted).
104. See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12955 (West 2005) (prohibiting
discrimination based on sexual orientation in housing, accommodations, and land
use decisions); CAL. CIV. CODE § 51(b) (West 2007) (detailing that all individuals in
the state are free and equal regardless of their sexual orientation); CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 1365.5 (West 2008 & Supp. 2010) (prohibiting discrimination
based on sexual orientation in health care).
105. See, e.g., Dominguez v. Wash. Mut. Bank, 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 705 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2008) (sexual orientation discrimination in employment); Doe v. Cal. Lutheran
High Sch. Ass'n, 88 Cal. Rptr. 3d 475 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (sexual orientation
discrimination in education).
106. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996). For further
discussion of Romer, see supra Section III.A.3. See infra Section IV.A.2 for a
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Even with the above distinctions, California equal protection
doctrine substantially parallels its federal counterpart. Though
differences exist, the two lines of authority have enough in common to
adapt the petitioners' argument in In re Marriage Cases to federal
law.
C. In re MarriageCases andFederalEqual ProtectionDoctrine
Under California law, domestic partnerships accord virtually
identical state benefits to same-sex couples as opposite-sex couples
receive in civil marriage. 107 Thus, under state law, one could view the
distinction between the two as merely one of name or designation.
This does not remove the equal protection problem inherent in the
classification, but makes it more susceptible to characterization as
merely nominal, rather than a reflection of meaningful legislative
classification. However, when considered under federal law, real and
tangible government benefits are denied to same-sex couples as a
result of enactments like Proposition 8. The California Supreme Court
identified some of these: "Social Security, Medicare, federal housing,
food stamps, federal military and veterans' programs, federal
employment programs, and filing status for federal income tax
purposes."' 0 8 Because federal law restricts these and other federal
benefits only to marriages "between one man and one woman,"1 09
such classifications impose real and serious consequences on samesex couples. Indeed, on which side of the classification a couple falls
will determine whether federal law affords a couple recognition and
benefits.110 This is far from the mere dignitary stigma of having one's
relationship accorded a name different from similar relationships.
discussion of Lawrence v. Texas, which the Supreme Court decided on substantive
due process grounds, but appeared to apply an unnamed, heightened standard of
review similar to that used in Romer.
107. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5(a) (West 2004 & Supp. 2010).
108. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 417 (Cal. 2008).
109. Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006).
110. Incidentally, not all state benefits available to opposite-sex spouses are
available to registered domestic partners in California. See In re Marriage Cases,
183 P.3d at 416 n.24. For example, California makes no provision for the
contracting of confidential (without being made public) domestic partnerships;
however, California allows this procedure with respect to marriages. Id.
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Although existing authority may well support recognizing sexual
orientation as a suspect or quasi-suspect classification in its own right,
In re Marriage Cases should be adapted to show that laws restricting
marriage exclusively to opposite-sex couples are unconstitutional on
the basis of existing authority. To that end, a viable equal protection
claim can be made on the basis of currently existing gender
discrimination jurisprudence.
1. Classificationson the Basis of Sexual Orientation as Gender
Discrimination
Independent of any protected status to which it is otherwise
entitled, sexual orientation is a gender-based classification subject to
intermediate scrutiny. Existing state bans on same-sex marriage and
the federal Defense of Marriage Act"' ("DOMA") all use
approximately the same language: marriage shall consist of only one
man and one woman. As developed below, this is a facial gender
classification that, under federal equal protection jurisprudence,
should draw intermediate scrutiny.
Under existing same-sex marriage bans, "[i]f a person, male or
female, wishes to marry, then he or she may do so as long as the
intended spouse is of a different gender. It is the gender of the
intended spouse that is the sole determining factor."ll 2 Although this
appears to be a gender-based classification, disadvantaging one who
wishes to marry a person of the same gender, some courts disagree.
The California court of appeal held the distinction "treat[s] men and
women exactly the same, in that neither group is permitted to marry a
person of the same gender." 1 3
The California Supreme Court took a different approach but
arrived at the same result. In rejecting the gender-discrimination
approach of the court of appeal, the court found the following:

111. DOMA purports to permit the denial of full faith and credit to same-sex
marriages across state lines. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006). DOMA also provides that
the federal definition of marriage shall be "only a legal union between one man and
one woman as husband and wife." 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006).
112. Opening Brief on the Merits, supra note 5, at 25 (internal quotations and
citations omitted).
113. In re Marriage Cases, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 675, 706 (Ct. App. 2006).
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[P]ast judicial decisions, in California and elsewhere, virtually
uniformly hold that a statute or policy that treats men and women
equally but that accords differential treatment either to a couple
based upon whether it consists of persons of the same sex rather
than opposite sexes, or to an individual based upon whether he or
she generally is sexually attracted to persons of the same gender
rather than the opposite gender, is more accurately characterized as
involving differential treatment on the basis of sexual orientation
rather than an instance of sex discrimination, and properly should
be analyzed on the former ground. 114
Although the California Supreme Court may have discounted the
gender discrimination argument because of its decision to recognize
sexual orientation as a suspect classification in its own right, the
reasoning above is unpersuasive. State supreme court opinions in
Massachusetts, 1 s Hawaii,' 1 6 and Vermont' 17 have urged that such
classifications are properly characterized as classifications based on
gender.
The California courts disagreed that federal and state decisions
that invalidated anti-miscegenation statutes 1 8 were applicable in the
context same-sex marriage bans, finding instead that:
[Such

cases]

are

clearly

distinguishable . . .

because

the

antimiscegenation statutes at issue in those cases plainly treated
members of minority races differently from White persons....
Under these circumstances, there can be no doubt that the
reference to race in the statutes at issue in [those cases]
unquestionably reflected the kind of racial discrimination that
always has been recognized as calling for strict scrutiny under
equal protection analysis....
... [C]ourts have recognized that a statute that treats a couple

differently based upon whether the couple consists of persons of
114. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 437 (Cal. 2008).
115. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 971 (Mass. 2003)
(Greaney, J., concurring).
116. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 60 (Haw. 1993) (plurality opinion).
117. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 904-05 (Vt. 1999) (Johnson, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
118. Miscegenation refers to "[a] marriage between persons of different
races." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1088 (9th ed. 2009). For a discussion of these
cases, see infra Sections IV.A and IV.B.
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the same race or of different races generally reflects a policy
disapproving of the integration or close relationship of individuals
of different races in the setting in question, and as such properly is
viewed as embodying an instance of racial discrimination with
respect to the interracial couple and both of its members."'
The California Supreme Court indicates that cases invalidating
anti-miscegenation statutes are somehow limited to their facts.
However, "[a]lthough Loving arose in the context of racial
discrimination, prior and subsequent decisions of [the U.S. Supreme
Court] confirm that the right to marry is of fundamental importance
for all individuals."' 2 0 Thus, decisions striking down antimiscegenation statutes are not the result of specialized rules applicable
only in the context of race classifications. Rather, these decisions
apply general equal protection principles to a specific set of
circumstances. Therefore, the equal protection principles that
prompted the U.S. Supreme Court to invalidate race-based restrictions
on marriage are equally applicable when those restrictions are genderbased. Just as "a statute that [restricts marriage based on the race of
the would-be spouses] generally reflects a policy disapproving of the
integration or close relationship of individuals of different races,"l 21 a
statute that treats a couple differently based upon its composition as
either same-sex or opposite-sex generally reflects a policy that
disapproves of close relationships between individuals of the same
gender. Additionally, "[i]f.. . 'equal protection of the laws' means
anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare ... desire to harm a
politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate
governmental interest," 22 and if that interest is not even legitimate, it
cannot meet the exceedingly persuasive justification' 2 3 required to
support a gender classification.
Finally, "' [e]qual protection of the laws is not achieved through
indiscriminate imposition of inequalities."'l 24 The U.S. Supreme
119.
120.
omitted).
121.
122.
123.
124.

In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 437.
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (emphasis added) (citation
In re MarriageCases, 183 P.3d at 437.
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996).
See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
Romer, 517 U.S. at 633 (quoting Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 635
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Court has repeatedly rejected "the notion that the mere 'equal
application' of a statute . .. is enough to remove the classifications

from the Fourteenth Amendment's proscription of all invidious ...
discrimination[]." 2 5 Therefore, the California appellate court's
finding that California's same-sex marriage ban did not impose a
gender-based classification, because it applied equally to men and
women, cannot be squared with U.S. Supreme Court precedent.
Such bans "expressly and directly refer to the gender of
individuals allowed to participate in the institution of marriage" 26 and
thereby draw a facial gender classification. Under the bans, males can
marry females, but not males; females can marry males, but not
females. "It is the gender of the intended spouse that is the sole
determining factor."' 27
Accordingly, laws limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples draw
a facial gender classification; therefore, they should be subject to
intermediate scrutiny under federal law. It is impossible to identify all
possible state interests that one could assert in defense of a same-sex
marriage ban. States could assert, for example, that they have an
interest in preserving the traditional definition of marriage, fostering
procreation, or protecting the welfare of children.
It is doubtful that one could persuasively make such an argument.
If one could successfully make such an argument, then the courts
hearing the cases striking down anti-miscegenation statutes would
have held differently. After all, prior to the decision in Loving v.
Virginia,128 many, if not most states, had anti-miscegenation statutes
on the books. Therefore, the "traditional" definition of marriage
contemplated that marriage would occur only between persons of the
same race. If the state had a compelling interest in preserving the
(1950)).
125. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8 (1967). But see Geduldig v. Aiello, 417
U.S. 484, 497 n.20 (1974) ("While it is true that only women can become pregnant it
does not follow that every legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a sexbased classification. ... Absent a showing that distinctions involving pregnancy are
mere pretexts designed to effect an invidious discrimination against the members of
one sex or the other, lawmakers are constitutionally free to include or exclude
pregnancy from the coverage of legislation . .. on any reasonable basis . . .
126. Opening Brief on the Merits, supra note 5, at 28.
127. Id. at 25.
128. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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"traditional" definition of marriage, it is difficult to imagine how a
statute limiting marriage only to persons of the same race could have
been invalidated, even under strict scrutiny. Indeed, such a statute
would not just be narrowly drawn, but perfectly drawn, to achieve that
assumed compelling interest. Therefore, if there is a compelling
government interest in preserving the "traditional" definition of
marriage, it would easily survive even the most exacting constitutional
scrutiny. In sum, it is difficult to argue against a change in the law by
asserting "tradition."
Although other state interests, such as the interest in promoting
the welfare of children, may be sufficiently important to initially
justify gender classification, a ban on same-sex marriage is unlikely to
be sufficiently related to fulfillment of that interest and, thus, survive
intermediate scrutiny. Because total bans are almost certain to be
exceedingly over-inclusive and under-inclusive in their operation, they
will fail any kind of heightened scrutiny. Same-sex marriage bans that
purport to promote children's welfare are necessarily premised on the
argument that a child with parents of opposite genders will fare better
than a child with same-sex parents. Putting aside the fact that
empirical evidence does not support this proposition,129 a same-sex
marriage ban premised on this kind of argument is, in its very nature,
likely to be extremely over-inclusive and under-inclusive in its
operation. Thus, it should arguably fail on that basis.
For example, many opposite-sex parents endanger the welfare of
their children, but are unaffected by same-sex marriage bans.130
Hence, such bans are under-inclusive because they do not restrict
129. See, e.g., MARY PARKE, ARE MARRIED PARENTS REALLY BETTER FOR
CHILDREN? WHAT RESEARCH SAYS ABOUT THE EFFECTS OF FAMIY STRUCTURE ON

CHILD WELL-BEING

6 (2003),

available at http://www.clasp.org/admin/site/

publicationsstates/files/0086.pdf; Marua Dolan, Children Thrive Equally with
Same-Sex, Heterosexual Parents, Psychologist Testifies at Prop. 8 Trial, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 15, 2010, available at http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2010/01/
children-thrive-equally-with-same-sex-heterosexual-parents-psychologist-testifiesat-prop-8-trial.html.
130. One 2007 study reports that out of approximately 859,000 cases of child
maltreatment, 56.5% of the perpetrators were women, 42.4% were men, and a
staggering 87.7% of the perpetrators were the biological parents of the abused child.
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., CHILD MALTREATMENT 2007, at 65-66

available
(2009),
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/statsresearch/index.htm#can.
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persons who should be restricted. Conversely, many same-sex parents
safeguard the welfare of their children at least as well as opposite-sex
parents. 13 1 Thus, a ban would be over-inclusive because it
unnecessarily disadvantages parents who should not be burdened.
The foregoing example is typical of a total ban's application,
regardless of what interest proponents use to justify it. Total bans
indiscriminately impose a disability upon all who fall within their
sphere of operation, without regard to individual characteristics.
Indeed, it is exactly this characteristic of total bans that ensures their
demise under strict, or even intermediate, scrutiny. Courts are unlikely
to accept the high degree of over-inclusiveness and underinclusiveness inherent in same-sex marriage bans as "substantially
related" to the state interests that purport to justify these bans. Thus,
total bans are unlikely to survive intermediate scrutiny.
The application of intermediate scrutiny in United States v.
Virginial32 is particularly relevant in the context of same-sex
marriage. There, the Virginia Military Institute ("VMI") "reserve[ed]
exclusively to men the unique educational opportunities" it offered,
and completely barred women from enrolling. 13 3 VMI asserted that its
single-sex policy was justified because it "provide[d] important
educational benefits" not found in integrated environments and
because the program provided "diversity in educational
approaches."l 34 The Supreme Court found that VMI failed to show an
exceedingly persuasive justification for gender classification. The
Court "assumed, for the purposes of [its] decision, that most women
would not choose VMI's" program, but emphasized that the issue
before the Court was "whether the [State] can constitutionally deny
[admission] to women who have the will and capacity" to enroll at
VMI.13 5 Answering in the negative, the Court found that Virginia's
justifications relied on overbroad generalizations about "the way
women are" 136 and fell "far short of establishing the exceedingly
persuasive justification that must be the solid base for any gender131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

See, e.g., PARKE, supra note 129; Dolan, supra note 129.
518 U.S. 515 (1996).
Id. at 519.
Id. at 535 (citations omitted).
Id. at 542.
Id. at 550.
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defined classification."' 3 7 Most importantly, the Court explained that
"estimates of what is appropriate for most women [do not] justify
denying opportunity to women whose talent and capacity place them
outside the average description."l 38 In other words, the Court found
that as long as some women had both the will and capacity to submit
to VMI's adversative method of instruction, Virginia could not
constitutionally prohibit them from doing so. 139
As discussed above, same-sex marriage bans operate to disable
persons from marriage who are otherwise qualified to marry, on the
basis of the gender of the contracting parties. It is the sex of the
intended spouse that solely determines whether two persons may
marry.140 Each of the intended spouses desires to marry the other and
would have the capacity to marry but for the operation of a same-sex
marriage ban. Thus, the legal posture of two adult, same-sex partners
who wish to marry is virtually indistinguishable from that of the
women disadvantaged by VMI's policy in United States v. Virginia.
Same-sex marriage bans impose a constraint on the ability to marry
that is justified primarily because the "traditional" definition of
marriagel41 estimates what is appropriate for most couples. However,
same-sex couples have the will and capacity to marry, notwithstanding
a prohibition on their ability to do so, which places them outside the
average description. Thus, same-sex partners are in a position
identical to the applicants in United States v. Virginia: but for a
gender-based prohibition on their ability to take advantage of state
benefits, both would have the capacity and ability to do so. Unless
states can establish an exceedingly persuasive justification for
imposing such a disability, supported by sufficiently strong evidence,
they cannot use gender classifications to prevent two people who
otherwise have the capacity and ability to marry from doing so.
137. Id. at 546 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
138. Id. at 550.
139. VMI's adversative method "features '[p]hysical rigor, mental stress,
absolute equality of treatment, absence of privacy, minute regulation of behavior,
and indoctrination of desirable values.' . . . VMI cadets live in Spartan barracks

where surveillance is constant and privacy nonexistent; they wear uniforms, eat
together in the mess hall, and regularly participate in drills." Id. at 522 (quoting
United States v. Commonwealth, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1421 (W.D. Va. 1991).
140. Opening Brief on the Merits, supra note 5, at 25.
141. E.g., between a man and a woman.
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Absent such an exceedingly persuasive justification, same-sex
marriage bans cannot survive intermediate scrutiny under United
States v. Virginia.
Although one could argue that sexual orientation is a suspect or
quasi-suspect classification in and of itself, classifications based on
sexual orientation are independently reducible to gender
classifications and courts should accord a commensurate level of
scrutiny. Indeed, because gender itself is a quasi-suspect
classification, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court would accord
sexual orientation more protection than gender receives. However, no
state interest is likely to justify a total ban on same-sex marriage,142
and intermediate scrutiny is sufficient to strike down such bans under
federal equal protection jurisprudence.
2. Classificationson the Basis of Sexual
Orientationas "Animus"
Same-sex marriage bans should be subject to some form of
heightened scrutiny. As rational basis review is highly deferential, one
would certainly face an uphill battle in attempting to invalidate the
142. California's Proposition 8, the enactment challenged in Perry, is uniquely
vulnerable to attack on these grounds. Same-sex marriages performed in California
prior to the effective date of Proposition 8 are valid. Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48,
122 (Cal. 2009). Therefore, Strauss actually creates three distinct classes for equal
protection purposes: (1) unmarried individuals who wish to marry a person of the
same sex, but are precluded from doing so by Proposition 8; (2) individuals who
married someone of the same sex prior to the effective date of Proposition 8 and
whose marriage is therefore recognized by the State of California; and (3) persons
who are or seek to be married to someone of the opposite sex.
As discussed above, the equal protection clause requires that the connection
between a challenged law and an asserted state interest must be at least rational. A
state cannot rationally claim, for example, that banning same-sex marriage serves
the state interest of ensuring the welfare of children, or of preserving the traditional
definition of marriage, when the state allows same-sex couples to marry. A state that
refuses to recognize a relationship generally, but recognizes the same relationship in
some instances, cannot then claim that the general refusal is justified on the basis of
an interest that would require all instances of the relationship to be prohibited. This
is absurd as a matter of common sense. Thus, California's decision to recognize
some same-sex marriages precludes the state from asserting any of the state interests
mentioned herein, and likely leaves California without any state interest with even a
rational connection to Proposition 8.
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classification on this standard. However, sufficient evidence may exist
to show the actual purpose of the classification was animus toward
gay and lesbian individuals. If same-sex marriage proponents could
persuade the reviewing court that this animus was indeed the actual
purpose, and the proffered "legitimate" state interest was not the
actual purpose, then courts could invalidate same-sex marriage bans
on rational basis review.
To the extent that legislatures and voters enacted same-sex
marriage bans out of fear that same-sex marriage would harm the
institution of marriage, it would be quite possible to establish that
animus toward gay and lesbian individuals played an impermissible
role in the enactment of those measures. If animus motivates the
enactment of a same-sex marriage ban, Romer indicates that such a
ban would be invalidated, even if a legitimate interest exists that
would independently justify the ban in the absence of animus.
Finally, to the extent that all conceivable legitimate state interests
relate to child-rearing, family stability, and other such goals, sufficient
evidence may exist to show that the classification does not rationally
relate to furthering that interest. However, as the rational basis
standard is quite deferential to legislative action, it is unlikely that
such evidence would be so overwhelming as to remove from debate
the connection between means and ends. Thus, unless same-sex
marriage proponents can show animus, a same-sex marriage ban
would be much more likely than not to be upheld on rational basis
review.
IV. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law. .. "143 The Fifth Amendment's
Due Process Clause, applicable to the federal government, contains
similar language.144 The meaning of the word "liberty" is vague and
may connote different meanings to different individuals. 145 Although
143. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
144. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall any person .. . be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law. . . .").
145. See generally Charles Warren, The New "Liberty" Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 39 HARV. L. REv. 431, 440 (1926) ("[U]nder the common law, the
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earlier cases and scholarly works took a relatively narrow view of the
Due Process Clause,146 courts now interpret its protection of "liberty"
to
denote[] not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the
right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry,
establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according
to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those
privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.147
Further, substantive due process is concerned with the principle
that "liberty may not be interfered with, under the guise of protecting
the public interest, by legislative action which is arbitrary or without
reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the
state to effect." 48 Among all of the liberty interests protected by the
Due Process Clause, individuals enjoy "certain fundamental rights
[that] must be respected." 49 Although all liberty interests are
important, fundamental rights have received special protection from
government interference. 50
word 'liberty' meant simply 'liberty of the person,' or, in other words, 'the right to
have one's person free from physical restraint."'). But see Allgeyer v. Louisiana,
165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897) (holding that "liberty" under the Due Process Clause
"means, not only the right of the citizen to be free from the mere physical restraint
of his person . . . but . . . to embrace the right of the citizen to be free in the

enjoyment of all his faculties; to be free to use them in all lawful ways; to live and
work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any
livelihood or avocation, and for that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be
proper, necessary, and essential to his carrying out to a successful conclusion the
purposes above mentioned.").
146. See, e.g., Warren, supra note 145.
147. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
148. Id. at 399-400.
149. Id. at 401.
150. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) ("Where certain

'fundamental rights' are involved, the Court has held that regulation limiting these
rights may be justified only by a 'compelling state interest,' and that legislative
enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at
stake."). Cf Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (employing rational
basis review where no fundamental right was implicated).
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An examination of the implied fundamental right to marry is of
obvious relevance to this debate. In the following discussion, the
federal and California substantive due process doctrines are developed
for purposes of comparison.
A. Substantive Due Process in the United States Supreme Court
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized the
existence and special place of implied fundamental rights under the
United States Constitution. Implied fundamental rights and liberties
are those that "are, objectively, 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history
and tradition,' and 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' such
51
that 'neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.'"
"The Fourteenth Amendment 'forbids the government to infringe ...
"fundamental" liberty interests at all, no matter what process is
provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling state interest."' 152 Thus, the Supreme Court applies strict
scrutiny to laws infringing on a fundamental liberty interest. 153 By
contrast, laws that do not implicate fundamental rights are subject
only to rational basis review.1 54
When dealing with a fundamental right, the Supreme Court
"require[s]... a 'careful description' of the asserted fundamental
liberty interest."' 5 5 Framing a fundamental right too narrowly can
produce unjust results, and Part 2 will explore this effect in the context
of laws regulating homosexual conduct. First, however, this Comment
explores the scope and nature of the fundamental right to marry as
recognized by the Supreme Court.
1. Marriageas a FundamentalRight

151. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21 (citations omitted).
152. Id. at 721 (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)).
153. See supra Section III.A.I.
154. See, e.g., Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (law prohibiting assisted suicide did
not implicate a fundamental right and was upheld under rational basis review). As is
the case with equal protection, a statute will be upheld on rational basis review "if
the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state
interest." City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
155. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (citation omitted).
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The right to marry is a fundamental liberty interest protected by
the Due Process Clause in the United States Constitution. Though the
Supreme Court hinted at a fundamental right to marry in many of its
early privacy cases,15 6 it clearly articulated the right for the first time
in Loving. 157 There, the Court invalidated Virginia's criminal
miscegenation statute on both equal protection and substantive due
process theories.'
"The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the
vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by
free men,"1 59 placing it at the heart of the liberty interest protected by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 160 Although
Loving arose in the context of racial discrimination, later Supreme
Court decisions have made clear that the right to marry extends to all
individuals.1 6 1 And although the state may impose "reasonable
regulations that do not significantly interfere with the decision to enter
into the marital relationship," 62 laws that interfere directly and
substantially with the right to marry are impermissible unless
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. 163
The Supreme Court's judgment in Turner v. Safley1 64 is consistent
with this principle.1 65 There, state prisoners sought to overturn prison
156. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
157. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
158. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978).
159. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
160. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 384 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
(1923)).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 386 (citing Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 55 n. 12 (1977)).
163. Id. at 388.
164. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
165. The Turner Court recognized that Zablocki applies even to prison
inmates. Id. at 95 ("We disagree with petitioners that Zablocki does not apply to
prison inmates. It is settled that a prison inmate 'retains those [constitutional] rights
that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate
penological objectives of the corrections system."' (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417
U.S. 817, 822 (1974) (alteration in original))). However, the Court did not apply
strict scrutiny. Instead, the Court asked whether the regulation was 'reasonably
related' to legitimate penological objectives, or whether it represents an
'exaggerated response' to those concerns." Id. at 87 (citations omitted).
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regulations that conditioned their right to marry on the warden's
approval, and only if "compelling" reasons existed to grant it.166
While the Court recognized the nature of incarceration meant the State
would be able to burden the prisoners' liberty by imposing additional
burdens that would not be permissible outside a prison setting, 167 the
State could not completely bar the prisoners from marriage.' 68 Finding
that "important attributes of marriage remain ... after taking into
account the limitations imposed by prison life,"1 69 particularly
emotional bonding and receipt of government benefits conditioned on

Finding that this "reasonable relation" test was not satisfied, the Court
invalidated the regulation. Id. at 99 ("[T]he almost complete ban on the decision to
marry is not reasonably related to legitimate penological objectives. We conclude,
therefore, that the Missouri marriage regulation is facially invalid."). While the
Court's application of the "reasonable relation" test seems to conflict with its
observation that Zablocki applies to prison inmates, the conflict is reconciled by
reading the "reasonable relation" test, as applied in Turner, as one for determining
whether the challenged policy is a "reasonable regulation[] that do[es] not
significantly interfere with the decision to enter into the marital relationship," which
under Zablocki would be permissible. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386 (citing Califano,
434 U.S. at 55 n.12).
The unstated rationale in Turner, therefore, is the following: because the
challenged regulation was not reasonable, it amounted to a direct and substantial
burden on the decision to marry, and was unconstitutional unless it met strict
scrutiny. In finding the policy was not reasonably related to any of the interests
asserted in its defense, the Court would necessarily have found that strict scrutiny
was not satisfied. A regulation that bears no reasonable relation to such interests
cannot, a fortiori, be necessary to achieve them. This construction of Turner
reconciles the governing Zablocki rule, the unique nature of the prison environment,
and the Court's application of the "reasonable relation" test.
166. Turner, 482 U.S. at 82.
167. Id. at 88 ("As Pell acknowledged, the alternative methods of personal
communication still available to prisoners would have been 'unimpressive' if
offered to justify a restriction on personal communication among members of the
general public." (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 825 (1974))); see also id. at
95 ("The right to marry, like many other rights, is subject to substantial restrictions
as a result of incarceration. Many important attributes of marriage remain, however,
after taking into account the limitations imposed by prison life."). For example,
prison officials could prevent prisoners from having sex. ESKRIDGE, supra note 13,
at 129.
168. Turner, 482 U.S. at 96.
169. Id. at 95.
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marriage,1 70 the Court held that prisons could not completely deny
prisoners the right to marry while in prison.' 7 '
Interestingly, the Turner Court upheld the prisoner's right to
marry even though, at least for the near future, no procreative activity
would result from such a marriage. This important consideration
belies a justification commonly asserted in defense of same-sex
marriage bans: the fundamental purpose of marriage is to facilitate
procreation and child-rearing.1 72 Ultimately, procreative intent is not a
prerequisite to the issuance of a marriage license.1 73 Nonetheless,
opponents of same-sex marriage interpose the physical impossibility
of procreation as a justification for denying politically unpopular
groups access to civil marriage.174
Loving's progeny further established that "'freedom of personal
choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

170. Id. at 95-96.
171. Id. at 99. The Court recognized, however, a very narrow exception to this
rule. Id. at 96 ("Taken together, we conclude that these remaining elements are
sufficient to form a constitutionally protected marital relationship in the prison
context.

Our decision in Butler v. Wilson, 415 U.S. 953 (1974) .

.

. is not to the

contrary. That case involved a prohibition on marriage only for inmates sentenced to
life imprisonment; and, importantly, denial of the right was part of the punishment
for crime." (emphasis added)).
A literal reading of this passage would suggest that, in order to deprive an
inmate completely of the right to marry, the inmate must be serving a life sentence,
and with some kind of determination that he or she would not be permitted to marry.
If this reading of Turner is correct, this is an extremely narrow exception to the
general rule and, as such, would be rarely, if ever, satisfied.
172. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 13, at 96-98.
173. In California, for example, persons desiring to marry need only have the
capacity to legally contract a marriage, consent to the marriage, and solemnize the
marriage in a manner approved by the state. CAL. FAM. CODE § 300 (West 2004 &
Supp. 2010). Indeed, Eskridge details how little the state seems to care about who is
entering into the marriage, and whether or not those individuals can procreate. See
ESKRIDGE, supra note 13, at 96-98.
174. This justification is not an invention of same-sex marriage opponents.
The Missouri Supreme Court, for example, found that it is "a well authenticated fact,
that if the issue of a black man and a white woman, and a white man and a black
woman, intermarry, they cannot possibly have any progeny, and such a fact
sufficiently justifies those laws which forbid the intermarriage of blacks and
whites." State v. Jackson, 80 Mo. 175, 178 (1883).
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Amendment.'" 1 75 It bears repeating that freedom of personal choice
with respect to marriage, in addition to the right to marry, is a
fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause.
2. FramingFundamentalRights Questions
Before a reviewing court can evaluate a substantive due process
question on the merits, it must first determine the right at issue.
Particularly in the context of laws that abridge fundamental rights, and
therefore draw strict scrutiny, a court's definition of the right at issue
is usually outcome determinative. Framing an issue too narrowly
produces unjust results and creates bad precedent. To illustrate this
point, consider and compare the holdings in Bowers v. Hardwickl76
and Lawrence v. Texas.' 7 7 These cases involved virtually identical
facts but reached opposite holdings. Though not dealing specifically
with the right to marry, these cases exemplify the consequences of
improperly framing a fundamental right and counsel against repeating
this error in the context of the right to marry.
In Bowers, the State charged Michael Hardwick with violating
Georgia's sodomy statute for engaging in sexual conduct with an adult
male companion within the privacy of his home.' 7 8 Although he was
not charged, Hardwick sought a judicial determination that Georgia's
sodomy statute was unconstitutional.179 The U.S. Supreme Court
framed the issue as whether there was a constitutionally-protected
18 With the issue
fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy.s
framed in this manner, it is not surprising that the Court answered in
the negative."' One cannot argue with any degree of seriousness that
175. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (quoting
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974)).
176. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986) ("Against this
background, to claim that a right to engage in [consensual homosexual] conduct is
'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition' or 'implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty' is, at best, facetious." (citations omitted)), overruled by Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
177. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
178. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 187-88; see also ESKRIDGE, supra note 13, at 134.
179. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 188.
180. Id. at 192.
181. Id. at 195-96.
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the right to engage in sodomy is one "deeply rooted" in our history
and traditions, or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."' 82
Bowers dealt a major setback to same-sex couples seeking marriage
on equal terms with opposite-sex couples, for "the criminalization of
gay persons' intimate sexual conduct was a barrier to equal protection
claims, and was used to justify legalized discrimination against gay
persons in many spheres of life."l 83
The facts in Lawrence were materially similar to those in Bowers.
A police officer entered the home of John Geddes Lawrence,
whereupon he observed Lawrence and a male companion having
sex. 184 Lawrence was arrested, charged with engaging in deviate
sexual intercourse, and convicted. 8 5 The state court of appeal, relying
on Bowers v. Hardwick, rejected Lawrence's due process and equal
protection arguments.' 86 Recognizing that the Bowers Court did not
correctly frame the liberty interest at issue,' 8 7 the Court alternatively
framed the issue as whether Lawrence and Garner "were free as adults
to engage [in consensual sexual activity] in the exercise of their liberty
under

the

Due

Process

Clause .

."'88

Answering

in

the

affirmative,' 89

the Court reaffirmed that "our laws and tradition afford
constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to
marriage .... Persons in a homosexual relationship may seek

182. See, e.g., id. at 193-94 (citations omitted) (discussing the history of
criminal sodomy statutes in the United States).
183. Shotwell, supra note 6, at 658-59 (citation omitted).
184. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562-63 (2003).
185. Id. at 563.

186. Id.
187. Id. at 567 ("The Court began its substantive discussion in Bowers as
follows: The issue presented is whether the Federal Constitution confers a
fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy and hence invalidates the
laws of the many States that still make such conduct illegal and have done so for a
very long time. That statement, we now conclude, discloses the Court's own failure
to appreciate the extent of the liberty at stake. To say that the issue in Bowers was
simply the right to engage in certain sexual conduct demeans the claim the
individual put forward, just as it would demean a married couple were it to be said
marriage is simply about the right to have sexual intercourse." (internal quotations
and citations omitted)).
188. Id. at 564.
189. Id. at 578.
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autonomy for these purposes, just as heterosexual persons do. The
decision in Bowers would deny them this right." 90
Arguably, the most fascinating aspect of the Lawrence decision is
the near hostility with which the Court viewed the challenged law and
its scathing repudiation of Bowers.191 The Court concluded: "The
petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State
cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their
private sexual conduct a crime."l 92 The Court went out of its way to
articulate its reasons for striking down Bowers on due process-not
It explained that using the equal
equal protection-grounds.
protection clause might cause some to question "whether a prohibition
would be valid if drawn differently, say, to prohibit the conduct both
between same-sex and different-sex participants."193 The Court's
unusual expression of disdain for the challenged statute and express
articulation of its reasons for relying on the Due Process Clause 94
indicate that laws targeting gay and lesbian persons have begun to
wear out their welcome. Indeed, "[t]his, as a general rule, should
counsel against attempts by the State, or a court, to define the meaning
of the relationship or to set its boundaries absent injury to a person or
abuse of an institution the law protects." 95

190. Id. at 574.
191. See, e.g., id. at 578 ("Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it
is not correct today. It ought not to remain binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick
should be and now is overruled.").
192. Id.
193. Id. at 575.
194. Because laws invalidated under the Due Process Clause have
impermissibly infringed upon a liberty interest protected by the Constitution, they
cannot be saved by drawing them differently. Laws invalidated under the Equal
Protection Clause, by contrast, can become constitutional by drawing them
differently. For example, the Court in Lawrence indicated it could not save the
statute from an equal protection challenge by drawing the statute in such a way as to
make it apply equally to homosexual and heterosexual persons. Lawrence, 539 U.S.
at 578. Thus, the Lawrence Court's express articulation of its desire to avoid a
saving construction indicates that the Court took issue with the type of legislation,
rather than the challenged individual statute.
195. Id. at 567.
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B. Substantive Due ProcessAnalysis in California
Like its federal counterpart, California due process jurisprudence
recognizes a fundamental right to marry. The right to marry is
recognized in California as one of many fundamental,
constitutionally-protected interests; it is protected by the right to
privacy expressly enumerated in the California Constitution.' 9 6
Further, California's right to marry jurisprudence is parallel to, and is
not meaningfully different from, its federal counterpart.
In Perez v. Lippold,19 7 a case very similar to Loving, the
California Supreme Court held the state's miscegenation statute
unconstitutional under federal equal protection guarantees. 198 There,
the Court recognized a fundamental right to marryl 99 and held laws
that infringe upon this right "must be based upon more than prejudice
and must be free from oppressive discrimination. . . ."20 Other
California authorities make it clear that strict scrutiny applies to laws
infringing upon a fundamental right are subject to strict scrutiny to
determine if they are necessary to achieve a compelling state
interest. 20 1
The Perez Court elaborated further on the right to marry: "the
right to marry is the right to join in marriage with the person of one's
choice, a statute that prohibits an individual from marrying a member
of a race other than his own restricts the scope of his choice and
thereby restricts his right to marry."202 Obviously, anti-miscegenation
statutes are not the only way to restrict the scope of one's choice of
spouse. A law that prohibits marriage between persons of different
religions, of the same sex, or who are citizens of different states,
would equally restrict the scope of one's choice of spouse. Under
196. "All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable
rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring,
possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness,
and privacy." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1.
197. 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948).
198. Id. at 29.
199. Id. at 18-19.
200. Id. at 19.
201. See, e.g., Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 485 P.2d 529, 538-42 (Cal. 1971);
D'Amico v. Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 520 P.2d 10, 22 (Cal. 1974).
202. Perez, 198 P.2d at 19.
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Perez, each of these hypothetical laws would accordingly infringe the
right to marry. Indeed, there is nothing that would logically limit the
Perez Court's holding to race-based restrictions on the right to marry.
Perez explicitly stated that a law prohibiting a particular choice of
spouse would "thereby restrict [one's] right to marry" and therefore be
subject to strict scrutiny.2 03 Thus, Perez could not realistically be
limited to race-based restrictions on the right to marry. Nonetheless,
litigants did not often ask California courts to address substantial
restrictions on marriage after Perez was decided.2 04
Of course, In re Marriage Cases recognized that the right to
marry extends to same-sex couples. While Proposition 8 has since
overruled this aspect of In re Marriage Cases, it is important to note
that relying on California precedent quite similar to the due process
jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court, the petitioners'
arguments persuaded the California Supreme Court in that case.
Declaring Family Code sections 300 and 308.5 unconstitutional, the
court was unimpressed by respondents' arguments that: (1) the state
never recognized same-sex marriage before and had a legitimate
interest in preserving the traditional definition of marriage; 2 05 and (2)
the petitioners were asking the court to create a new substantive
right-the right to same-sex marriage-instead of merely defining the
boundaries of an existing right.2 06 The court rejected these arguments
out of hand. 207 Citing the Bowers and Lawrence decisionS208 and its
203. Id.
204. However, "subsequent California decisions discussing the nature of
marriage and the right to marry have recognized repeatedly the linkage between
marriage, establishing a home, and raising children in identifying civil marriage as
the means available to an individual to establish, with a loved one of his or her
choice, an officially recognized family relationship." In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d
384, 422 (Cal. 2008). For two such cases, see De Burgh v. De Burgh, 250 P.2d 598
(Cal. 1952) and Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1988).
205. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 447 (Cal. 2008).
206. Id.at420-21.
207. The court instead held that "the right to marry represents the right of an
individual to establish a legally recognized family with the person of one's choice,
and, as such, is of fundamental significance both to society and to the individual." In
re MarriageCases, 183 P.3d at 423. The court continued:
In light of the fundamental nature of the substantive rights embodied in
the right to marry - and their central importance to an individual's
opportunity to live a happy, meaningful, and satisfying life as a full
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own jurisprudence,2 09 the California Supreme Court found that the
parties were not asking it to create a new right.2 10 Instead, the court
held that the parties asked the court to decide whether the
constitutional right at issue "should be understood in a broader and
more neutral fashion so as to focus upon the substance of the interests
that the constitutional right is intended to protect." 2 11 The court's
language deserves repeating:
[T]his court's 1948 decision holding that the California statutory
provisions
prohibiting
interracial
marriage
were
unconstitutional . .. did not characterize the constitutional right

that the plaintiffs in that case sought to obtain as "a right to
interracial marriage" and did not dismiss the plaintiffs'
constitutional challenge on the ground that such marriages never
had been permitted in California. Instead, the Perez decision
focused on the substance of the constitutional right at issue-that
is, the importance to an individual of the freedom to join in
marriage with the person of one's choice-in determining whether
the statute impinged upon the plaintiffs' fundamental constitutional
right. 212
The California Supreme Court was influenced by the U.S.
Supreme Court's admitted error in characterizing the right at issue in
Bowers, and its subsequent correction of the issue's framing in
Lawrence.2 13 By carefully framing the issue before it in terms of "the
interests that the constitutional right is intended to protect," 214 the
member of society - the California Constitution properly must be
interpreted to guarantee this basic civil right to all individuals and
couples, without regard to their sexual orientation.
Id. at 427.
208. Id. at 421.

209. Id.at420-21.
210. Id. at 421 ("[I]n evaluating the constitutional issue before us, we consider
it appropriate to direct our focus to the meaning and substance of the constitutional
right to marry, and to avoid the potentially misleading implications inherent in
analyzing the issue in terms of 'same-sex marriage."').
211. Id. at 421 n.33 (citing the rationale in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,
565-77 (2003)).
212. Id. at 420 (citations omitted).
213. Id. at 421.
214. Id.
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California Supreme Court avoided framing the right too narrowly.
Thus, it also avoided creating the kind of unsatisfactory precedent
created in Bowers and subsequently overruled in Lawrence.
Accordingly, the California Supreme Court's approach in defining the
right at issue provides better guidance in fundamental rights analysis
than the U.S. Supreme Court's current practice.2 1 5
C. In re Marriage Cases and the FederalRight to Marry
California and federal substantive due process jurisprudence agree
that liberty interests embodied in their respective due process clauses
protect the right to marry.2 1 6 The agreement between the two bodies of
law does not end there. Federal and state due process cases
substantially concur on both the scope and substance of the right to
marry.
Interestingly, the U.S. Supreme Court in Loving did not view the
contested right as the right to interracial marriage, but rather as the
unqualified right to marry. 2 17 The body of federal case law on the right
to marry closely parallels that of California as it existed when In re
MarriageCases was decided in 2008.218
The California Supreme Court also recognizes and protects a
fundamental right to marry under the state constitution. California due
process jurisprudence holds that "the right to marry is the right to join
215. The U.S. Supreme Court lacks a test for defining the fundamental right at
issue. One position, advocated by Justice Scalia in the opinion of the Court in
Michael H. v. GeraldD., would "refer to the most specific level at which a relevant
tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be identified."
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989). Because only one other
Justice joined this part of the opinion, this standard has no precedential value. In
contrast, Justice Brennan argued that "the question is not what 'level of generality'
should be used," but rather whether the interest at issue "is close enough to the
interests that we already have protected to be deemed an aspect of 'liberty' as well."
Id. at 142 (Brennan, J., dissenting opinion).
216. See supra Sections IV.A and IV.B.
217. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) ("The freedom to marry
has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men . . .. Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry

or not marry, a person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be
infringed by the State.").
218. See discussionsupra Sections IV.A. and IV.B.
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in marriage with the person of one's choice . . . ."219 A statute that
restricts the scope of one's choice of spouse thereby restricts his right
to marry. 220 Laws abridging that right must "be based upon more than
prejudice and must be free from oppressive discrimination,"221 and
courts must subject these laws to strict scrutiny to determine whether
they are necessary to achieve a compelling state interest.2 22 This
rationale is powerful, persuasive, and completely applicable to the
right to marry in federal jurisprudence.
The cases cited in this section demonstrate that the right to marry
is a fundamental right. However, even where the right is recognized
and the problem is merely one of application, courts have been
tempted to redefine the right narrowly. By framing the right in Bowers
as "the right to engage in homosexual sodomy," 223 the Bowers Court
lost sight of the forest for the trees. The Court recognized this
oversight when it decided Lawrence.
Nevertheless, the Court's narrow framing of the right at issue in
Bowers illustrates the danger of improperly framing the right to marry.
Framing the right to marry too narrowly in the context of same-sex
couples will have unjust results. Learning from the error in Bowers,
courts should recognize that the issue in cases challenging the validity
of same-sex marriage bans is, in fact, not an issue at all; it is settled
law. Specifically, these cases do not require recognition of a new
substantive right, such as a right to same-sex marriage. Instead, these
cases implicate the fundamental right to marry and to be free from
direct and substantial government interference in matters of marriage.
In defending their same-sex marriage bans, states have suggested
that reviewing courts are asked to recognize a new right-the right to
same-sex marriage-and have thereby invited courts to reproduce the
error in Bowers. However, given Bowers' reversal, after only
seventeen years, due to improper framing of the right in question, it is
unlikely the Supreme Court would accept an invitation to commit the
same error again. This is especially true because only seven years
have passed since Lawrence was decided. Thus, the same right at
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17, 19 (Cal. 1948).
Id.
Id.
Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 485 P.2d 529, 539-42 (Cal. 1971).
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986).
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issue in In re Marriage Cases, Perez, Zablocki, and Loving-the right
to marry-properly frames the right at issue in Perry. To define the
right more narrowly would repeat an error the Supreme Court has
denounced in unusually strong terms, and would negate Court
precedent.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed and protected the
fundamental right to marry under the federal Constitution. Although
reasonable regulations may be imposed that do not significantly
interfere with the decision to enter into the marital relationship, a law
that interferes directly and substantially with the right to marry is
impermissible unless it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state
interest. 2 24 Moreover, the Supreme Court stated that the right to marry
is a right held by all individuals. 225 Efforts to deny a marriage license
even to prisoners have been unsuccessful, 226 in part because the right
to marry is not2 27 and may not 2 28 be conditioned on the spouses' intent
to procreate.
Freedom of personal choice in marriage is a fundamental liberty
interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.2 2 9 One's choice of
spouse is usually a matter of personal choice that goes to the heart of
one's marriage decision. Restricting or narrowing the scope of that
choice does not merely interfere with that choice; in the context of
same-sex marriage, such a restriction absolutely forecloses the ability
of the individual to marry the spouse of his or her choice. Therefore, a
law that restricts or narrows the scope of one's choice of spouse
224. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386-88 (1978).
225. Id. at 384.
226. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 99-100 (1987).
227. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 13, at 96-98; see also CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 30004 (West 2004 & Supp. 2010).
228. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972) (recognizing
fundamental liberty interest in decisions relating to contraception); Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (recognizing fundamental liberty interest
in decisions relating to family relationships); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel.
Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942) (recognizing fundamental liberty interest
in decisions relating to procreation). These cases, taken together, provide strong
support for the proposition that individuals have a fundamental right, protected by
the Due Process Clause, to decide whether, when, and how to bring a child into the
world.
229. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (quoting
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974)).
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interferes directly and substantially with the freedom of personal
choice in marriage, and with the right to marry itself.
Accordingly, a state cannot impose such restrictions unless the
restrictions meet strict scrutiny; that is, they must be narrowly tailored
to serve a compelling state interest. As discussed in the context of
equal protection, it is highly unlikely that a same-sex marriage ban
could survive intermediate scrutiny, even when considered in
connection with the compelling state interest of promoting child
welfare. A restriction that cannot meet intermediate scrutiny cannot, a
fortiori,meet strict scrutiny.
Finally, as discussed in the context of equal protection, states
impose total bans indiscriminately and without regard to individual
characteristics. Therefore, these bans are almost certainly substantially
over-inclusive and under-inclusive in their application. A
classification that is appreciably over-inclusive or under-inclusive is
not narrowly tailored and would fail strict scrutiny.
V. CONCLUSION

Although the California Supreme Court has held that the right to
marry includes and applies equally to same-sex couples,23 0 given the
substantial agreement between California and federal jurisprudence on
the matter, this difference appears to result primarily from timing. The
U.S. Supreme Court has not yet had the issue squarely presented to it.
Enter Perry. Destined for Supreme Court review, Perry will pose the
issue as a federal question. Some commentators suggest that Perry is
destined to fail. 23 1 Yet, in light of the remarkable similarity between
federal and California equal protection and substantive due process
doctrines, and Perry's recent success in the district court, such
speculation seems pessimistic at best. Though the California Supreme
Court's decision in In re Marriage Cases is not and could not be

230. Proposition 8, of course, reversed this development in California law.
231. See, e.g., Talbot, supra note 8 ("Nan Hunter, a law professor at
Georgetown University, is skeptical about [the Perry lawyers'] chances. 'As a
purely formal matter, one could argue that [they] are correct,' Hunter said. 'But
invalidating roughly forty state laws that define marriage as between a man and a
woman is an awfully heavy lift for the Supreme Court, and especially for Justices
who take a limited role of the scope for the judiciary."').
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binding on the U.S. Supreme Court, the arguments from that case
apply with at least as much force in the federal context.
California equal protection doctrine differs from its federal
counterpart in that it recognizes sex classifications as suspect, rather
than quasi-suspect. However, notwithstanding that difference, laws
limiting civil marriage to opposite-sex couples draw invidious gender
classifications and are properly subject to intermediate scrutiny under
federal law. Furthermore, fertile soil exists in federal law for
recognizing that the right to marry extends on equal terms to both
same-sex couples and opposite-sex couples, and in applying strict
scrutiny to laws abridging that right. Thus, in light of federal
precedent, reasoning parallel to that advanced in In re MarriageCases
should yield a federal decision that approximates the decision reached
by the California Supreme Court.
California has often been on the cutting edge of civil rights issues
and has been the source of many decisions that were ahead of their
time. Just as Perez anticipated a nationwide trend toward race equality
in marriage, In re Marriage Cases appears to have anticipated a
similar trend with respect to gender. Perry v. Schwarzenegger offers
the U.S. Supreme Court the opportunity to provide an authoritative
pronouncement on the right of same-sex couples to marry; an issue
that has troubled the nation for over thirty years. 232 In re Marriage
Cases provides a vehicle by which a pronouncement can be made on
the basis of existing law. With same-sex couples in every state
struggling for equal treatment under the law, and a deep split of
232. The Court, however, may well decline to take the opportunity. California
Governor Arnold Schwarzenneger and the other defendants in Perry have declined
to appeal the district court's decision. Erwin Chemerinsky, Who Has Standing to
Appeal Prop. 8 Ruling?, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2010, available at
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/aug/15/opinion/la-oe-chemerinsky-gay-marriage20100815. While the defendant-intervenors appealed the decision, U.S. Supreme
Court precedent is clear that an intervenor has no standing to appeal a judgment
when the state defendant chooses not to appeal. See, e.g., Diamond v. Charles, 476
U.S. 54, 68 (1986) ("[One's] status as an intervenor below, whether permissive or as
of right, does not confer standing sufficient to keep the case alive in the absence of
the State on this appeal."). But see Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 136 (1986)
(Intervenor state had standing to appeal where the constitutionality of its own statute
was challenged, notwithstanding the federal government's decision to abandon its
own appeal). Due to the unique circumstances presented in Perry, therefore, the
district court decision will likely be upheld based on the defendant-intervenors' lack
of standing to challenge it.
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authority on the issue, the Court should take this opportunity to "say
what the law is" 2 33 and resolve with finality one of the great civil
rights issues of our time.
Dan J. Bulfer*

233. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
* J.D. Candidate, California Western School of Law, 2011.
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